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SHADES OF DESHANEY OFFICIAL LiABiLrrY UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 1983 FOR SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
I. INTRODUCTION
May school officials and school systems be held liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983' when their students are sexually abused at
school by a faculty member or another student? The answer to this
question turns on the interpretation of DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services.' The Supreme Court held in
DeShaney that public officials and agencies do not have an affir-
mative duty of protection, unless the person needing protection is
in the custody of the official or agency.' The federal courts have
had some difficulty in applying DeShaney to cases where there has
been sexual abuse in the schools, and two perspectives have
emerged on the issue of whether students are in the custody of the
schools. Two recent appellate court decisions, D.R. by L.R. v. Mid-
dle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School' and Doe v. Taylor
Independent School District,5 illustrate these two positions. The
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (creating liability for deprivation of constitutional rights
under color of state law).
2. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
3. Id. at 200-01.
4. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
5. 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1436 (1993), vacated, 987
F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit reheard Taylor en banc and vacated the deci-
sion. Thus, Taylor is no longer binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit. However, the
Taylor opinion provides the most coherent argument for holding a school constitutionally
liable for the safety of its students, and will therefore be analyzed in this paper. Addition-
ally, upon rehearing, the Fifth Circuit sidestepped DeShaney, and avoided the issue of
whether the public schools have custody of their students. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch.
Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). Instead the court upheld
liability against the school's principal under the "alternative liability" theory. Id. at 457.
The "alternative liability" theory is discussed in section VII of this Note. See infra notes
242-77 and accompanying text.
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Middle Bucks court held that students were not in the custody of
the school and therefore the school officials did not have an affir-
mative duty to protect their students.' In contrast, the Taylor court
held that students were in the custody of the school and school
officials do have a duty to protect the students Whether a school
will be liable for sexual abuse depends on how a court interprets
the meaning of custody in DeShaney.
First, this Note examines how widespread sexual abuse in the
public schools has become. Second, this Note describes the history,
purpose, and applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Third, the Note
discusses the development of § 1983, and how, in certain circum-
stances, public officials can be held constitutionally liable for inac-
tion. Fourth, this Note examines the DeShaney decision which
promulgated the "custody" test for determining constitutional liabili-
ty for government inaction. Fifth, there is a detailed examination of
the arguments in the Middle Bucks and Taylor opinions which each
applied the DeShaney test differently in cases of sexual abuse in
the public schools. Sixth, this Note evaluates possible alternative
theories for holding school systems and school officials liable for
sexual abuse that occurs at school. In conclusion, this Note advo-
cates the proposition that school systems should be found to have
custody of their students, and therefore, should be held accountable
for failing to protect the students from sexual abuse. This approach
effectuates the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and provides
schoolchildren with the protection they need.
I1. THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
There is a widespread problem of sexual abuse of children in
the public schools. In 1993, there were 160 reported allegations of
sexual abuse in the New York Public School System; however,
school investigators believed that only a fraction of the incidents
were actually reported Unfortunately, the abuse reported in New
York appears typical of other school systems.9
News reports from the last several years indicate how acute
this problem has become. For example, in June 1993, nine elemen-
6. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372.
7. Taylor, 975 F.2d at 147.
8. Josh Barbanel, Panel Named To Prevent Child Abuse In Schools, N.Y. lIMEs, Dec.
10, 1993, at B3 (detailing the establishment of a commision to address sexual abuse of




tary school students were charged with sexually abusing a class-
mate.'" On March 8, 1993, a substitute teacher was charged with
sexually abusing an eleven-year-old female student, and "[t]he
teacher had threatened the girl with punishment if she told any-
one."" In December 1990, a school bus driver was charged with
sexually abusing seven students repeatedly. 2 In April 1990, a
public school Dean was arrested for sexually abusing a thirteen-
year-old girl.' 3 The February 10, 1989 issue of the Washington
Post reported that police were investigating two reports of child
sexual abuse, 6ne involving a teacher who molested thirteen girls
over a two-to-three year period, and another where a male teacher
sexually abused several of his male students. 4 In February 1988,
the Fairfax, Virginia County school system dismissed eight employ-
ees for sexually abusing students. 5 In February 1986, four Chica-
go public school teachers were arrested for sexually abusing their
students.'6 Ed Stancik, six weeks after assuming the post of chief
investigator for the New York City school system, had five teach-
ers arrested for sexual abuse, and was investigating twenty-five
"serious allegations."' 7 Mr. Stancik stated that the sexual abuse in
the schools "seems to be worse than was anticipated," and that he
was "surprised by the extent of the problem." 8 These are only a
few of the numerous examples of sexual abuse in the public
schools.
The extent of sexual abuse in the public schools is also indi-
cated by the measures that the school systems and state legislatures
have taken to curb the abuse. For example, the Washington state
House of Representatives considered a bill that "would bar any
10. Melinda Henneberger, Yonkers School Game or Sex Abuse?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
1993, at B4 (reporting alleged abuse of a student by other students that school officials
explained as a "game" that got out of hand).
11. Substitute Teacher Held on Sex Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at B3 (detail-
ing a teacher's arrest on a charge of sexually abusing a student).
12. Robert E. Tornasson, Bus Matron Charged in Sex Abuse of Handicapped Students,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at B2.
13. Sylvia Moreno, Discipline Dean Accused of Molesting Pupil, NEWSDAY, Apr. 24,
1990, at 32.
14. Abuse Reports in Howard, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1989, at C6.
15. D'Vera Cohn, Fairfax Schools Cited 8 Over Sexual Impropriety, WASH. POST, Feb.
9, 1988, at Bl.
16. Jerry Thornton & Henry Wood, Public School Teacher Charged in Sexual Abuse of
2 Students, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 27, 1986, at 7.
17. Dennis Hevesti, Investigator Arrests Five in Six Weeks in the Sexual Abuse of Stu-
dents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at B3.
18. Id.
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person who has sexually abused a child from ever holding a job in
the public schools."' 9 However, current Washington law allows a
person who has been convicted of sexual abuse to receive teaching
credentials ten years after the conviction." In Connecticut, two
state representatives introduced a bill that would allow schools to
do background checks on all job applicants.2 The Chicago Board
of Education has implemented criminal background checks on all
new employees. In addition, a "hot line" has been set up to en-
courage students to report incidents of sexual abuse.' The New
York public school system "has formally declared a ban on sexual
relationships between school employees and students."24 This sam-
ple of measures taken by schools and state legislatures to stop
sexual abuse indicates how serious a topic and how widespread a
problem sexual abuse has become.
One disturbing aspect of the problem is the apparent lack of
concern on the part of some school officials. Their collective reac-
tion to sexual abuse has been described as a "conspiracy of si-
lence,"'  indicating that many school administrators choose to ig-
nore sexual abuse in the hope that the problem will disappear.
Specifically, there are numerous instances where school officials
have decided to ignore, or even conceal, evidence of sexual abuse.
An example of this "conspiracy of silence" occurred recently
at a high school near Washington, D.C. Ronald Price, a teacher at
Northeastern High School, was convicted on September 10, 1993,
of sexually abusing three female students.26 "A State panel found
that Price's conduct was common knowledge ... and that high-
ranking school officials failed to investigate complaints."' 7 Another
19. A Better Environment for Kids--Two Bills To Make Public Schools Safer, SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1993, at A6.
20. Id.
21. Dan Haar & Kathleen Megan, Police Checks of Teachers Illegal; East Hartford
Legislators Want To Bring Them Back; Criminal Histories Schools Issue, HARTFORD COiU-
RANT, Jan. 12, 1993, at Al (detailing efforts to reinstate background checks of teachers
which had previously been a violation of state law).
22. Casey Banas, School Board Requires Background Checks, C. TRtB., March 14,
1986, at 7.
23. Jean Latz Griffin & Jerry Thornton, Former Teacher Tosses a Line to Sexually
Abused Students, Cm. TRIB., March 10, 1986, at 1.
24. Sylvia Moreno, Board of Ed Bans Sex Between Students, Staff, NEWSDAY, May 30,
1991, at 4.
25. Barbanel, supra note 8, at B3.
26. Lisa Leff, Arundel Schools Grant Amnesty for Failure to Report Abuse, WASH.




example of this callous attitude toward sexual abuse occurred in a
New York public school. An eight-year-old girl was raped on
school grounds by the school's custodian." "The girl eventually
reported the rape to Mrs. Moolenar [the principal], who responded
by interrogating the youngster in an intimidating manner and alert-
ing the custodian to the complaint before the case had been report-
ed to the police . ..."29 Mrs. Moolenar's intention was to get the
girl to recant her allegation," and the truly sad aspect of this inci-
dent is that the school board did not discipline Mrs. Moolenar for
her actions.3
Another example of this willful blindness occurred in a New
York school in 1990. A teacher lied on his employment application
to conceal a public indecency conviction, and charges pending in
New Jersey for sexually assaulting two seven-year-old students at a
school where he had previously taught.32 The school's principal
knew of the teacher's background, including the sexual molestation
charges, yet failed to notify the school board.33
In Chicago, Ann Benedict, a former teacher, has set up a "hot
line" to allow students to report sexual abuse. Benedict states that
"the hot line is necessary because the present system does not
adequately protect students."34 In fact, the school faculty usually
ignores sexual abuse, and "[w]hen there is a sex abuser in a
school, it is usually common knowledge among the teachers. 5
The teachers don't come forward because the school system is an
army system, and you don't make waves."" Thus, the problem of
widespread sexual abuse in the public schools is compounded by a
conspiracy of silence that attempts to ignore or conceal the prob-
lem.
28. Sam Dillon, Board Reconsiders Discipline of Principal in Bronx Rape, N.Y. TIMS,
Feb. 27, 1993, at 25.
29. Id.
30. Josh Barbanel, Board Fails To Charge Principal, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1993, at
B3.
31. Id.
32. Sylvia Moreno, Fernandez Removes Principal; Didn't Heed Sex Claims About
Teacher, NEWSDAY, Jan. 12, 1990, at 7.
33. Id.
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i1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
"A primary function of the federal courts is to provide relief
against governments and government officers for their violations of
the Constitution and laws of the United States."'37 42 U.S.C. §
1983 is the mechanism under which citizens can sue state and
local governments and government officers for constitutional viola-
tions.38 The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statue, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress ... .
Specifically, § 1983 creates a cause of action against local govern-
ments and their officials if they violate a citizen's constitutional or
legal rights.' To advance a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show
that a "person" acting "under color of state law" violated a right
granted to him or her by the Constitution or by a federal law.4'
A. The Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of "Under
Color of State Law"
Section 1983 was first passed in 1871 in response to violence
against blacks in the South.42 Widespread violence against blacks,
initiated or encouraged by the Ku Klux Klan, erupted in the South
after the Civil War, and the Southern states were unable or unwill-
ing to put a stop to the Klan's illegal activities.43 Congress react-
ed by creating a federal remedy for these civil rights violations:
[O]ne reason [§ 1983] was passed was to afford a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
37. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 369 (1989) (describing and analyzing
the doctrines and policies that shape the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States).
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
40. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 370.
41. Id. at 377.
42. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOvERNMENT 47 (1983) (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
was originally Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act).
43. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 373.
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passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws might
not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agen-
cies.'
Thus, this legislation was passed because Congress did not believe
that state courts wouldprotect the constitutional rights of blacks.'
Despite the statute's broad language, it was originally interpret-
ed narrowly as a remedy for a specific problem, namely "the mis-
treatment of Southern blacks during the Reconstruction."' Section
1983 was seldom used prior to 1939, and then only to challenge
the constitutionality of voting restrictions.47 But, from that point
on, the Supreme Court began to expand the use of § 1983 to cases
involving the deprivation of due process rights.'
The 1961 Supreme Court decision in Monroe v. Pape is re-
sponsible in large part for the expansion of § 1983's applicabili-
ty.49 In Monroe, the plaintiff alleged that:
thirteen Chicago police officers, led by Deputy Chief of
Detectives Pape, broke through two doors of the Monroe
apartment, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights, and
forced them at gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked
in the center of the living room; that the officers roused
the six Monroe children and herded them into the living
room; that Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times
with the flashlight, calling him 'nigger' and 'black boy';
that another officer pushed Mrs. Monroe; that other officers
hit and kicked several of the children and pushed one of
them to the floor; that the police ransacked every
room ... that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police
station and detained on 'open' charges for ten hours ...
that he was not advised of his procedural rights; that he
was not permitted to call his family or an attorney; that he
was subsequently released without criminal charges having
44. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
37, at 374 (discussing the purpose of § 1983).
45. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 374.
46. ScHucK, supra note 42, at 47.
47. Id. at 47-48.
48. Id. at 48.
49. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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been filed against him.5"
The issue before the Supreme Court was the meaning of the phrase
"under color of state law" in § 1983." The defendants argued that
they were not liable under § 1983 because by violating state law
they could not be acting "under color of state law"." Thus, the
defendants advocated the position "that 'under color of state law
included only action taken by officials pursuant to state law. 53
However, the Court rejected the defendants' interpretation of
"under color of state law." The Court stated that the "[m]isuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is
action taken 'under color of' state law. 54 Therefore, whenever a
government official takes action in his official capacity, he or she
is acting under the color of state law even if the official's actions
are illegal under state law. Consequently, when school officials are
performing their official duties, they are acting under the color of
state law, and are liable under § 1983 for their constitutional torts.
B."Person" and § 1983 Liability
The Supreme Court, in Monell v. Department of Social Servic-
es,5" held that municipal governments were "persons" and there-
fore could be held liable under § 1983.56 The Court explained that
"Congress did intend municipalities and other local government
units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 ap-
plies."" However, the Court limited municipal liability by holding
that a municipality cannot be subject to liablity under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.58 Instead, municipal governments are
only liable for their own constitutional violations and not for the
50. Id. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 171.
52. Id. at 184.
53. Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327 n.10 (1940)).
54. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961).
55. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
56. Id. at 690-95 (overruling the portion of Monroe v. Pape that held that municipal
governments were not persons under § 1983). State governments cannot be sued in federal
court because these suits are precluded by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 339.
57. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 390 (discussing
the application of § 1983 to municipalities).
58. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 390. Note that
municipal governments are not liable for punitive damages under § 1983. See City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 259 (1981).
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violations of their employees5 Since school systems are a local
governmental unit, they are "persons" under § 1983 and can he
held liable under the statute.
Additionaly, both state government officials and local govern-
ment officials are "persons" under § 1983 and are subject to liabil-
ity accordingly.' However, the Supreme Court has exempted
some of these individuals from § 1983 liability when they are
acting in a certain capacity. Specifically, "the Court has recognized
absolute immunity for those performing judicial, legislative, and
prosecutorial functions."'" However, government officials acting in
an executive or administrative capacity are still liable under §
1983.62 Because school officials are local government officials
acting in such capacities, they are subject to liability under § 1983.
IV. THE ROAD TO DESHANEY
Using § 1983, which creates a vehicle whereby independent
violations of statutory or constitutional law can be redressed, sexu-
ally abused students can attempt to hold both the school officials
and the school system liable for a deprivation of their Fourteenth
Amendment liberty rights. A constitutional tort claim can be assert-
ed under § 1983 when a public official deprives an individual "of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws" of the United States. 3 Therefore, when a public official
deprives an individual of his or her Fourteenth Amendment liberty
right to bodily integrity, that official is liable for the deprivation.
However, mere negligence is insufficient to establish liability
for a constitutional tort." The Taylor court based this finding on
the Supreme Court's holding in Daniels v. Williams' that negli-
gent conduct does not violate the due process clause of the Four-
59. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
60. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 402.
61. Id. at 407 (finding that police officers also have immunity when acting as witness-
es, and the President of the United States has absolute immunity).
62. However, these officials do have a "good faith" affirmative defense. See id. at 414.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also William D. Valente, School District and Official Lia-
bility for Teacher Sexual Abuse of Students Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 57 EDuc. LAw
REP. 645, 645 (1990) (discussing the theories of constitutional tort liability for school
districts and supervisors under § 1983).
64. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct 1436 (1993), vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), reheard en banc, 15 F.3d
443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994).
65. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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teenth Amendment.66 However, in another Supreme Court case,
state actors were held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they
were "deliberately indifferent" to the injuries that their conduct
caused.67 Therefore, since school officials can only be held liable
for the sexual abuse occuring in their schools if they are deliber-
ately indifferent, the school official would have to know or strong-
ly suspect that sexual abuse was occurring, but do nothing to stop
if from continuing.
Most constitutional tort claims arise in the context of a govern-
ment official's action that deprives an individual of his or her
fundamental liberties. 68 However, plaintiffs may also bring a §
1983 claim against an official for inaction if that official had an
affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff's liberties.69 In light of
this, the Supreme Court has stated that a state does not have a
duty to protect individuals unless there is an affirmative duty of
care that the state has with respect to that particular individual."
The Court first recognized a circumstance which called for an
affirmative duty of care in Estelle v. Gamble.7 The Supreme
Court held that prison officials who, willfully or through deliberate
indifference, withheld medical treatment from inmates committed a
constitutional tort by violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment and were liable under § 1983.72
The Court reasoned that since the state's incarceration of the pris-
oners prevented the prisoners from providing medical care for
themselves, the state assumed an affirmative duty to provide neces-
sary medical care.73 The Court stated that it is necessary "that the
public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason
66. Id. at 332.
67. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). See also Sivard v. Pulaski
County, 959 F.2d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring deliberate indifference for culpability
under § 1983); Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 1987)
(requiring deliberate indifference or gross negligence for culpability under § 1983).
68. Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After DeShaney,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 1940, 1943 (1990).
69. Id.
70. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197-98
(1989) The Court stated that "[a]s a general matter, then, we conclude that a State's
failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause". Id. at 197. It is only "in certain limited circumstances
the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with
respect to particular individuals." Id. at 198.
71. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
72. Id. at 104-05.
73. Id. at 104.
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of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself."'74 Thus, incar-
ceration creates an affirmative duty for the state to care for and
protect prisoners.
In Youngberg v. Romeo75 the Supreme Court extended the
Estelle analysis from violations under the Eighth Amendment to
violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
held that a mentally retarded person involuntarily committed to a
state mental institution retained his Fourteenth Amendment liberty
rights, and the state had an affirmative duty to provide safe condi-
tions and reasonable training.76 The state, by committing a mental-
ly retarded person, assumes an affirmative duty to protect and care
for that person. If the state fails, it becomes liable to that person
for the deprivation of his or her Fourteenth Amendment liberty
rights.
V. THE DESHANEY DECISION
DeShaney has sparked the current controversy over whether
school officials can be held liable under § 1983 for sexual abuse
that occurs at school. In DeShaney, the Supreme Court attempted
to clarify when a public official or agency may be liable for con-
stitutional deprivations.' The Court held that in order for the state
to have an affirmative duty to care for or protect an individual,
that individual must be in the state's custody.78 However, the
problem with DeShaney is that it did not define custody, and thus
the circuit courts are interpreting "custody" differently.
The facts of the DeShaney case are "undeniably tragic."'79 In
March 1984, Joshua DeShaney, then four years old, was severely
beaten by his father, Randy DeShaney, while he was living with
him." As a result of this beating, Joshua suffered severe brain
damage and will spend the rest of his life in an institution for the
profoundly retarded." The Winnebago County Department of So-
cial Services (DSS) suspected prior to this beating that Joshua was
74. Id. (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)).
75. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
76. Id. at 316-19.
77. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195-200
(1989) (discussing alternative duties imposed on the states by the Constitution).
78. Id. at 200.
79. Id. at 191.
80. Id. at 193.
81. Id.
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being abused. 2 In January 1982, Randy DeShaney's second wife
filed a complaint with the police that Randy was abusing Joshua.
The DSS interviewed Randy DeShaney but did not pursue the
allegations after Randy denied them. In January 1983, Joshua was
admitted to a hospital for treatment of multiple abrasions and
bruises suffered as a result of beatings. DSS filed a child protec-
tion action. However, DSS concluded that it did not have enough
evidence to justify removing Joshua from his father's home. In-
stead, DSS recommended that Randy DeShaney get counseling and
enroll Joshua in a preschool program. Randy DeShaney agreed to
cooperate with the DSS, and the juvenile court dismissed the child
protection action. In February 1983, Joshua was once again admit-
ted to the hospital for treatment of injuries caused by beatings
administered by his father, but the DSS caseworker concluded that
there was still not enough evidence to support a child protection
action. Over the next six months, the caseworker made monthly
visits to the DeShaney home. During these visits, she noticed that
Randy DeShaney was not following any of the recommendations
made in January 1983, and that Joshua often had suspicious head
injuries. In November 1983, Joshua was again admitted to the
emergency room for injuries that the physicians believed to be
caused by child abuse. During the next two visits by the case
worker after the November incident, Randy DeShaney would not
allow the caseworker to see Joshua. These facts established that
prior to the March 1984 beating that left Joshua brain damaged,
the DSS was well aware that Joshua was in continuous danger at
the hands of his father.
Joshua, by his mother, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
against the DSS."3 The complaint argued that the DSS had de-
prived Joshua of his Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integri-
ty without due process of law by failing to protect Joshua from his
father.8 4 The district court granted a summary judgment for
DSS. 5 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision, stating that local governments do not have a duty
to protect people from violence committed by private actors. 6
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,




86. Id. at 193-94.
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held that the Winnebago County Department of Social Services did
not have a constitutional duty to protect Joshua from his father.'
The Court's reasoning was based on the notion that:
nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property
of its citizens against invasion by private actors. The
Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety
and security."
Thus, the Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government
officials from abusing their power and performing actions that
deprive people of their liberty rights." However, there is no con-
stitutional right to government aid when a private citizen intrudes
upon the liberty of another citizen; therefore, public officials cannot
be held liable under § 1983 for their inactions when failing to
protect individuals."°
The Court did state that under certain limited circumstances a
government agency or official may have an affirmative duty to
protect an individual.9' When the state has a special relationship
with an individual, the state has an affirmative duty to protect that
individual.' DeShaney limits "special relationships" to instances
where the state has custody of the individual.93 Thus, the state
assumes a duty of care "when the State by the affirmative exercise
of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him
unable to care for himself."94 The Court referred to both Estelle
and Youngberg as examples of situations where the state has re-
strained an individual's liberty, and thereby assumed a duty to care
for that individual.95 In sum, public officials have an affirmative
duty of protection if, and only if, the individual is in the state's
custody.
87. Id. at 203.
88. Id. at 195.
89. Id. at 196 (citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986)).
90. Id. at 197.
91. d. at 198.
92. Id. at 199-200 (defining the relationship as cases in which the State has taken a
person into custody against his will).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 200.
95. Id. See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (finding that the State has
a duty to committed mental patients); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (finding that
the state has a duty toward individuals); supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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Joshua's attorneys argued that a special relationship existed
between Joshua and DSS. They stated that a special relationship
was created because the DSS knew that Joshua was in danger, and
DSS had stated its intention to protect Joshua.' However, the
Court rejected this argument, insisting that "[t]he affirmative duty
to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from
the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his
own behalf. 9 7 Thus, only in instances where the individual is in
the state's custody is there an affirmative duty of protection.
The Court then applied these principles to the facts of the case
and concluded that the DSS was not liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Joshua was injured by his father who was not a state actor,
therefore, the state did not actively deprive Joshua of his Four-
teenth Amendment liberty rights.9" In addition, the court held that
DSS could not be held liable for failing to protect Joshua because
he was not in the custody of the DSS when his injuries oc-
curred. 9 Since Joshua was in the custody of his father, there was
no special relationship between DSS and Joshua, therefore, DSS
had no affirmative duty to protect Joshua.'"
VI. OFFICIAL LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
There are two distinct positions on how DeShaney should be
applied to situations of sexual abuse in the public schools. Plain-
tiffs in these cases assert that the school officials have an affirma-
tive duty to protect the students from sexual abuse.'"1 However,
according to DeShaney, public officials only have affirmative duties
when an individual is in their custody. 1°2 Therefore, the point of
contention is whether the school systems have custody of the stu-
96. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
97. Id. at 200.
98. Id. at 201.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.) (finding the children
to be in the school's custody), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). But see D.R. by L.R.
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d. Cir 1992) (rejecting
plaintiff's claim that children were in the school's custody), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045
(1993).




dents while they are in school. In D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks
Area Vocational Technical School, 3 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that students are not in the custody on the school
system. In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,"° the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that students are in the custody of
the schools.
A. The Middle Bucks Decision
The plaintiffs in Middle Bucks were two students, D.R. and
L.H., who attended a graphic arts class at the Middle Bucks
school." While attending the class during the 1989-90 school
year, they were sexually abused by several male students. Plaintiff
D.R. was attending Middle Bucks because she was hearing im-
paired and had related communication problems. She asserted that
from January 1990 to May 1990 several male students in her class
would force her into the classroom's unisex bathroom and sexually
abuse her two to four times per week. In addition, L.H. stated that
she was sexually abused two or three times each week from De-
cember 1989 to May 1990. The perpetrators touched the girls'
genitalia and breasts, sodomized them, forced them to perform
fellatio, and forced them to watch other students endure similar
abuse.
The school officials did nothing to stop this ongoing abuse.
Susan Peters was the student teacher of the graphic arts class. She
witnessed the plaintiffs being dragged off into the bathroom by the
perpetrators, yet she did not put a stop to this behavior. Peters
admitted that she could not control the classroom, and that she
herself along with other female students were subjected to non-
sexual abuse in the classroom. This abuse consisted of obscene lan-
guage and gestures, and offensive but not sexual touching. L.H.
stated that she told Assistant Director Bazzel of Middle Bucks
about the abuse, but Bazzel took no action. Plaintiffs also asserted
that other school officials knew of the chaotic situation in the
103. 972 F.2d at 1372-73.
104. 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1436 (1993), vacated, 987
F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), reheard en banc, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 70 (1994).
105. For the following facts in the Middle Bucks case, see D.R. by L.R. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
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classroom, but took no steps to remedy the problem.
The plaintiffs filed a claim against the school and several
named school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."° The district
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim."0 7 The district court held that the school did have an af-
firmative duty to protect the students from sexual abuse; however,
it dismissed the claim because the complaints did not allege that
the officials had sufficient knowledge of the abuse. 8 Without
such knowledge, the officials could not be deliberately indifferent,
and therefore, would not have the requisite mental culpability re-
quired for liability under § 1983."
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the defendants were not
liable under § 1983 because they had no affirmative duty to protect
D.R. or L.H. from sexual abuse."' The court noted that in order
to have an affirmative duty of protection, there must be a special
relationship between the state agency and the individual."' It re-
lied on the fact that "DeShaney ... declined to impose a consti-
tutional duty upon a state to protect the life, liberty, or property of
a citizen from deprivations by private actors absent the existence of
a special relationship.""' 2 In addition, the Third Circuit stated that
DeShaney limited these special relationships to situations where the
individual is in the custody of the state agency."
3
The plaintiffs contended that the Pennsylvania truancy laws that
mandate school attendance "so restrain school children's liberty that
[the] plaintiffs can be considered to have been in state 'custody'
during school hours for Fourteenth Amendment purposes."
'
"1 4
However, the court rejected this argument because mandatory
school attendance does not achieve the threshold of "custody" as
defined in DeShaney."' Therefore, the court held that the plain-
tiffs were not in the custody of the school. ' 6 In contrast, the





110. Id. at 1368-69.
111. Id. at 1369.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1370.
114. Id.




of custody. Incarceration and institutionalization are situations
where the individuals are physically restrained and are unable to
meet their basic needs. These "persons are wholly dependent upon
the state for food, shelter, clothing, and safety. It is not within
their power to provide for themselves, nor are they given the op-
portunity to seek outside help to meet their basic needs. Obviously,
they are not free to leave.' ' 17 The court also implied that the
physical restraint would have to be on an around the clock basis
when it stated that "[t]he state's duty to prisoners and involuntarily
committed patients exists because of the full time severe and con-
tinuous state restriction of liberty."". The court reasoned that on-
ly a similar restraint, one that deprives a person of the opportunity
to attend to his or her basic needs, physically confines them, and
prevents them from leaving, will satisfy the definition of "custody."
The Third Circuit then applied its interpretation of "custody" to
the facts of the case, and concluded that D.R. was not in the
school's custody. The plaintiffs were not in the school's custody
because the students were not physically restrained, and certainly
not restrained twenty-four hours a day." 9 Instead, the plaintiffs
did "leave the school building every day" and "[tlhe state did
nothing to restrict their liberty after school hours."'' Also, "the
school defendants did not restrict D.R.'s freedom to the extent that
she was prevented from meeting her basic needs.'' The court
reasoned that the plaintiffs' situation was not like that of a prisoner
or mental patient, because the plaintiffs were able to communicate
freely with the outside world, and the defendants "did not deny
[the plaintiffs] meaningful access to sources of help."'" There-
fore, the school's control over the plaintiffs was sufficiently exten-
sive to constitute custody and thus it did not fall within the special
relationship discussed in DeShaney." Therefore, the school did
not have an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiffs from the sexu-
al abuse.
Chief Justice Sloviter dissented in the Middle Bucks opinion.
Sloviter argued that the majority interpreted DeShaney too narrowly
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.
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and contended that individuals can be in the "custody" of a state
agency even when the agency does not have "total and continuous
custody of the individuals."'24 He argued that "DeShaney contains
no language to support the majority's holding that the duty to
protect can be triggered only by involuntary, round-the-clock, legal
custody."'" Sloviter concluded that in this case there was a spe-
cial relationship because the plaintiffs were in the "functional cus-
tody" of the school."2
According to the dissent, four factors place the students in the
functional custody of the school. These factors are: (1) school
attendance is mandated by law, (2) the students are minors whose
judgment is not mature, (3) the schools have discretion in control-
ling student behavior, and (4) the schools exercise control over the
students. 27 In explaining these four factors, the dissent observed
that truancy laws make attendance involuntary: "[a]lthough a stu-
dent is not held in school under shackles, there is substantial com-
pulsion associated with schooling."'" Second, students are minors,
and "the law recognizes that their judgment may not be fully ma-
ture and developed." '29 Third, the school officials have discretion
in controlling the students because "they are considered to stand in
loco parentis toward the students."'30 Fourth, because the school
stands in loco parentis, the "school officials can exercise control
over the movements of their students."'' Thus, students are com-
pelled to be at a certain place for a specified time each day, a
place where the officials there have complete authority over the
students. In addition, students themselves do not possess the mental
maturity to look out for their best interests. These factors consid-
ered together create a situation where the state has rendered stu-
dents incapable of acting in their own interest, much like a prison-
er or a committed mental patient, and therefore, the state assumes
a duty of protection.' In conclusion, the dissent would have re-
124. Id. at 1377 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1379.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1377 (Sloviter, I., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1379 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1380 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1379.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1377 (noting that these factors "combine to create the type of special reia-
tionship which imposes a constitutional duty on the schools to protect the liberty interests
of students while they are in the state's functional custody").
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manded the case, and had the lower court determine whether the
defendants violated their duty to protect the plaintiffs.'
B. The Taylor Decision3 '
In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,'35 a female stu-
dent was sexually abused by a teacher for over one year. Lynn
Stroud, the teacher, had a reputation for "favoring" his female
students, which included writing them love notes and physically
touching them in an inappropriate manner. The school began re-
ceiving complaints about Stroud's behavior in 1985. The plaintiff,
Jane Doe, was a freshman at Taylor High during the 1986-87
school year and was assigned to Stroud's class. Stroud became
enamored with the fourteen-year-old Doe and set out to seduce her.
Stroud gave Doe good grades without requiring her to do any
work, and he would take her to lunch and buy her alcoholic bever-
ages. Eventually, Stroud and Doe engaged in nonintercourse sexual
activity on the school grounds in the laboratory attached to his
classroom or at the school's field house. In addition, Stroud sexual-
ly abused Doe in his home.
On Valentine's Day, Stroud gave Doe a love note which was
found by Brittani B., one of Doe's friends. Brittani took the note
and gave it to Principal Lankford of Taylor High. Lankford told
Brittani that he was aware of rumors that Stroud and Doe were
sexually active. However, the only action Lankford took in re-
sponse to the valentine was to transfer Brittani (not Doe) out of
Stroud's class. Later that February, Mike Caplinger, the superinten-
dent of the school district, received complaints from other school
officials about Stroud's relationship with Doe. When Caplinger
contacted Lankford about this complaint, he was informed about
the other complaints Lankford had received about Stroud. However,
no action was taken.
133. Id. at 1383.
134. Again, it will be noted that Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1436 (1993), has been vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (5th
Cir. 1993), and reheard en banc, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70
(1994). Although this case is no longer binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit, it will be
analyzed because it provides the most complete argument for finding students in the cus-
tody of the school and allowing students, who are victims of sexual abuse while at
school, to sue the school system and the school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
supra note 5.
135. For the following facts of the Doe case, see Taylor, 975 F.2d at 138-40.
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In March or April 1987, when Doe was only fifteen, she final-
ly gave in to Stroud's pressures and they engaged in intercourse.
Over the next several months, Stroud had intercourse with Doe on
and off school grounds. By this time Stroud's "relationship" with
Doe was common knowledge among the students and faculty of
Taylor High and among some of the students' parents. In June
1987, Caplinger received a complaint from the parents of another
student who witnessed Stroud and Doe exhibiting inappropriate
behavior at a festival, but Caplinger dismissed the complaint with-
out any investigation.
On July 15, 1987, Doe's parents discovered a number of love
letters which Stroud had written to Doe. Up until this time, they
had no idea of the relationship because the school officials had not
informed Doe's parents of the complaints against Stroud. Doe's
parents notified Caplinger, who later spoke with Doe and Stroud.
The two denied that they were sexually involved. Apparently, Doe
lied because "she feared the repercussions of disclosure." Caplinger
was satisfied with the denials; he took no action and did not inves-
tigate any further.
Stroud continued to sexually abuse Doe when classes resumed
in the fall of 1987. On October 5, 1987, Doe's mother found more
love letters and consulted her attorney. The attorney discussed the
matter with Doe and was able to get Doe to admit what was hap-
pening. The attorney reported this to Caplinger, who finally sus-
pended Stroud. Later, Stroud resigned and pled guilty to criminal
charges.
Doe filed several claims, including a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Stroud, Lankford, Caplinger, and the school dis-
trict.136 Doe argued that the school system and its officials failed
to protect her from violations of her Fourteenth Amendment right
to bodily integrity. 3 ' The defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment was denied, and the defendants appealed. 3
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant the
defendants' motion for summary judgment.'39 The court held that
"[s]chool superintendents and principals have a duty to police the
halls of our public schools to insure that schoolchildren, who are
obligated to attend, have an opportunity to learn and study in a
136. Id.
137. Id. at 142.
138. Id. at 141.
139. Id. at 149.
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school environment free from sexual molestation and harass-
ment."'" Thus, the court remanded the case to the district court
for a trial to determine whether the defendants violated their duty
to protect Doe. 4'
The Taylor court interpreted DeShaney broadly to find that the
school and its officials had an affirmative duty to protect their
students from sexual abuse.42 Basically, the court found that stu-
dents are in the custody of the schools. 43 The school creates a
special relationship by compelling the child to attend,'" and this
relationship gives rise to an affirmative duty of protection.'45
The Taylor court further interpreted DeShaney as stating that
"custody" exists when the state restrains individuals in a way
which prevents those individuals from protecting themselves.1"
Therefore, the state must assume the duty to protect those whom it
has rendered helpless. In the case of schools, truancy laws remove
children from their parents for a part of each day. Children rely
upon their parents for protection because "a child is ordinarily
incapable of fending for himself."' 47 Removing the child's source
of protection places the child in the school's custody and creates a
special relationship. Therefore, the state assumes the duty to protect
the students "when it renders the guardian of that child powerless
to act on the child's behalf."' 4
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. There is no serious contention that sexual abuse by a teacher is not a violation of
a student's Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights: "T]he Constitution proscribes public
school teachers from sexually molesting our schoolchildren." Id. at 142.
143. Id. at 147.
144. lId
145. I&
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VII. ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE BUCKS AND TAYLOR 149
A. "Custody"
The difference between the result in Middle Bucks and the
result in both Taylor and the Middle Bucks dissent is how the
court interpreted the term "custody." Both courts agree that the
Fourteenth Amendment generally does not place an affirmative
duty of protection on the government. The Middle Bucks court
stated "that 'a State's failure to protect an individual against private
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause."" 5  The Taylor court also acknowledged that the state
normally has no duty of protection because "the Due Process
Clause does not require a governmental body to assist the pub-
lic.",5s
Both decisions also agreed that there must be a special rela-
tionship between the state and the individual in order for the state
to have an affirmative duty of protection. The Middle Bucks major-
ity relied on DeShaney in asserting that "'in certain limited circum-
149. This Note analyzes Middle Bucks and Taylor because they provide a detailed ex-
planation of their holdings. For cases that have held that schools do not have an affirma-
tive duty to protect their students, see Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.
1992) (addressing a student strangled by a bandana in a school cloakroom), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th
Cir. 1990) (finding that children were not rendered incapable of caring for themselves in
a sexual molestation case); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp 1560 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (stating that compulsory attendance does not create a special relationship);
Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (finding that a
special relationship arises where the state has prevented the plaintiff from protecting him
or herself); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992)
(holding that no special relationship exists between the school and a mentally handicapped
student), affd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993). For cases that have held that schools owe
their students an affirmative duty of protection, see Lichtler v. County of Orange, 813 F.
Supp 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (imposing a duty to protect school children from weather
disaster); Waechter v. School Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(stating that handicapped students had the necessary custodial relationship under
DeShaney); Pagano by Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp 641 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (recognizing an affirmative duty of the school to protect after 17 incidents of abuse
by other school children).
150. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1369 (3d. Cir. 1992) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489
U.S. 189, 193 (1989)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
151. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 146 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Grif-
fith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1436 (1993), vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993),
reheard en banc, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994).
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stances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties
of care and protection with respect to particular individuals."""
The Middle Bucks dissent also recognized that only certain types of
relationships give rise to an affirmative duty of protection.153 The
Taylor court voiced its agreement on this point by stating that "a
duty to provide adequate protective services may arise out of 'spe-
cial relationships' created or assumed by the state with regard to
particular individuals.' 54
The Middle Bucks and Taylor courts, and the Middle Bucks
dissent also recognized that DeShaney limited special relationships
to instances where the State has the individual in its custody. The
Middle Bucks court stated that DeShaney "left open the possibility
that the duty owed by a state to prisoners and the institutionalized
might also be owed to other categories of persons in custody."'55
Analogously, the Middle Bucks dissent acknowledged that under
DeShaney a special relationship is formed when the State restrains
an individual's freedom.5 6 The Taylor court stated that "[a] spe-
cial relationship exists 'when the State by an affirmative exercise
of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him
unable to care for himself.""5 7 Thus, these cases agree that spe-
cial relationships are limited to instances where the state takes a
person into its custody by limiting that person's freedom.
However, the courts differ in their interpretations of what con-
stitutes custody. The critical language of DeShaney which describes
"custody" states that "it is the State's affirmative act of restraining
the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incar-
ceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty-which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the
protections of the Due Process Clause."'58 The two positions,
symbolized by Taylor and Middle Bucks, disagree on what exactly
constitutes a "similar restraint of personal liberty."
152. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1369 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198).
153. Id. at 1377 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
154. Taylor, 975 F.2d at 146 (quoting Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1439).
155. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370.
156. Id. at 1379. The dissent avoids using the term "custody" because it feels that "cus-
tody" has connotations of full time physical restraint; however, the dissent does recognize
that DeShaney limited "special relationships" to instances where the State limits an
individual's freedom. Id.
157. Taylor, 975 F.2d at 146, (quoting Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991)).
158. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
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The Middle Bucks court narrowly interpreted the language in
DeShaney. The court noted that "[t]he state's duty to prisoners and
involuntarily committed patients exists because of the full time
severe and continuous state restriction of liberty in both environ-
ments."' 9 Thus, the court interpreted "other similar restraint of
personal liberty" to be a restraint that mimics incarceration or insti-
tutionalization requiring full time and continuous restraint of per-
sonal freedom. In addition, such restraint must be "severe" in that
it "renders [the individual] unable to care for himself, and at the
same time fails to provide for his basic human needs e.g. food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety."'" As a fi-
nal requirement, the restraint must also be physical in nature.'
Therefore, to the Middle Bucks court, custody meant full time and
continuous physical restraint that prevents the individual from
meeting his or her basic needs.
In contrast, the Taylor court and the Middle Bucks dissent
interpreted DeShaney's "other similar restraint" language broadly.
The Middle Bucks dissent noted that "DeShaney requires that the
state have imposed some kind of limitation on a victim's ability to
act in his own interests."'62 However, the state can limit an
individual's ability to act in his or her best interest without neces-
sarily placing the individual in continuous physical custody. In
addition, both the Taylor court and the Middle Bucks dissent be-
lieved that the state creates a special relationship when it makes an
individual dependent upon the state. The Middle Bucks dissent
explained that "' [a] proper analysis should look to [the] implica-
tions of custodial control, rather than only to the control itself,
because it is the underlying dependency that actually obligates the
state to act, not the state's legal status as custodian.""' In accor-
dance with this view, the Taylor court asserted that the state cre-
ates a special relationship in the school situation because "[p]arents,
guardians, and the children themselves have little choice but to rely
on the school officials for some measure of protection."'6 5 Thus,
159. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371.
160. Id. at 1370 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1379 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (quoting Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 458
(3d. Cir. 1989)).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1379 n.2 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (quoting Huefner, supra note 68, at 1957).
165. Taylor, 975 F.2d at 147 (emphasis added).
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when the state limits a person's freedom in a manner that makes
the person dependent upon the state for protection, the state has
taken that person into its functional custody, and therefore, has a
duty to protect that person.
B. The Broader Interpretation is the Appropriate Standard
The broader interpretation that would allow for affirmative
duties under relationships less restrictive than incarceration or insti-
tutionalization is a more appropriate reading of DeShaney.
DeShaney itself did not narrowly define custody. The Middle Bucks
dissent noted that "DeShaney contains no language to support [the
Middle Bucks majority's] holding that the duty to protect can be
triggered only by involuntary round-the-clock, legal custody."'" If
the Supreme Court had intended custody to exist only when the
individual was incarcerated or institutionalized, the Court would not
have included the phrase "other similar restraint" in its DeShaney
opinion.'67 Middle Bucks interpreted custody so narrowly that an
individual would have to be in a prison or a mental institution to
be in custody. This interpretation would make the additional lan-
guage in DeShaney superfluous. In fact, "DeShaney expressly rec-
ognized that there could be situations, beyond incarceration and
institutionalization, where constitutional protections may be
evoked.' 65
DeShaney linked custody to control when it held that the state
had an affirmative duty when it exercised its authority over an
individual and prevented that individual from caring for himself or
herself.'69 However, the state can have enough control over an
individual to limit that individual's ability to protect himself or
herself without imposing twenty-four-hour physical restraint. For
example, truancy laws exert control over the students by forcing
them to be in school at the specified times. However, the Middle
Bucks court contended that truancy laws exert less significant con-
trol because they only mandate that a child receive an education,
and a parent could instead place the child in private school.7 '
166. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1379.
167. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
168. Christopher Barr, Recent Decision, 66 TEMp. L. Rnv. 1063, 1071 (1993) (explain-
ing the reconciliation of the Stoneking decisions with DeShaney).
169. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
170. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371. The court noted that "it is the parents who de-
cide whether that education will take place in the home, in public or private schools." Id.
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Arguably, this is not a realistic view because private school is not
affordable for most families. Therefore, the truancy laws in effect
mandate public school attendance.'' The Middle Bucks majority
ignored the fact that public schools have a great deal of authority
and control over the students. The court stated that "faculty and
school officials have many of the privileges and immunities of
parents under state law including in loco parentis status, and the
right to administer proper discipline in order to maintain the class-
room."'72 Thus, the state exerts control over children through its
truancy laws and should expect to have the responsibilities which
come with that control.
The control that the state exerts in requiring children to attend
school prevents the children from caring for themselves. According
to Middle Bucks, "parents remain the primary caretakers [of their
children], despite their presence in school."'' Therefore, the
child's safety is the responsibility of the parents and not the
school. However, the Middle Bucks court missed a key point
that Taylor acknowledged. Since children are too immature to pro-
vide for their own protection, their source of protection is their
parents, the "primary caretakers."'75 By removing a child from the
home, the state is removing the child from its source of protection
and is depriving the child of the ability to protect itself because "it
renders the guardian of that child powerless to act on the child's
behalf."'176 "It is undeniable that schools not only restrict a
student's ability to act on his or her own behalf, but also prevent
parents or others from acting on the student's behalf."'" There-
fore, mandating school attendance creates an affirmative duty of
protection. It meets DeShaney's criterion that the state exercise its
power in a way that prevents an individual from caring for his or
her own needs.
Additionally, the Middle Bucks court was misguided in its
assertion that physical restraint is a necessary component of custo-
dy. It noted that DeShaney used incarceration and institutionaliza-
tion as examples of custody, and concluded that a common element
171. Barr, supra note 168, at 1072.
172. Id. at 1071.
173. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371.
174. Id. at 1371-73.
175. Taylor, 975 F.2d at 146.
176. Id.
177. Barr, supra note 168, at 1072.
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of these was physical confinement because prisoners and mental
patients "are not free to leave."'78 However, it makes no differ-
ence whether the state deprives liberty through force or threat of
force. Truancy laws are in essence a threat of force because they
rely on the principle of punishing parents or guardians for a child's
absence from school. This is just as compulsory as the actual use
of force, i.e., physically restraining someone. The Middle Bucks
dissent noted that "[a]lthough a student is not held in school under
shackles, there is substantial compulsion associated with school-
ing.' 79 Thus, although the mechanism of deprivation is different,
both force and threats of force are instances where the state is
depriving the individual of his or her liberty. The absence of actual
physical restraint in the school situation does not remove the custo-
dial nature of the relationship.
Furthermore, the Middle Bucks court was incorrect in distin-
guishing the school situation from incarceration and institutionaliza-
tion on the grounds that children have outside avenues of commu-
nication. The Middle Bucks court found that students are not in the
custody of the school because the students still have the ability to
communicate with people outside of the school. 8 ° In contrast,
prisoners and mental patients must route all of their communica-
tions through state officials. 8 ' Therefore, the schools do not have
the degree of control necessary to achieve custody because the
state does "not deny [students] meaningful access to sources of
help.' ' 2
However, the court's notion that children have access to out-
side help is flawed. The trauma associated with sexual abuse often
psychologically prevents the victim from revealing the abuse. Fed-
eral case law has recognized the notion that child-victims of sexual
abuse often are unable to relate their experiences.8 8 Additionally,
experts in the field of child psychology recognize that children are
178. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371.
179. Id. at 1379 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1372.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1459-60 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that "the
record contains materials documenting the reluctance of juvenile sexual abuse and incest
victims to disclose the experience"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987); Doe v. New York
City Dep't of Social Serv., 709 F.2d 782, 785 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that "a great ma-
jority of abused children deny occurrence of such abuse"), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic
Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
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reluctant to speak of their abuse. One expert writes that interview-
ing child-victims "is sometimes very difficult [because] [m]any
children will not want to [sic] talk about the sexual abuse."'84
This same expert included a separate section in her book on how
to interview children who are reluctant to disclose their experiences
because "[t]he child who willingly and readily talks about the
sexual abuse is the exception rather than the rule."'" Another
work used the term "silent rape" in referring to the widespread
phenomenon of adolescent victims hiding the fact that they are
being abused." 6 The authors observed that "the adolescent may
be the least likely person to report what has happened to the au-
thorities. Sadly, many adolescent victims do not tell their parents
or family members."'87 Thus, it is a well-established fact that
children who are victims of sexual abuse are reluctant to reveal
their experiences when interviewed by a psychiatrist and are even
less likely to volunteer the information on their own.
The law also recognizes that a child's judgment is not fully
mature. Justice Sloviter in his Middle Bucks dissent observed that
Pennsylvania children "cannot vote, they cannot serve in the armed
forces, if arrested, they are tried in juvenile courts, and if pregnant,
they must ask a parent for permission to have an abortion.' 88
Therefore, the final flaw with the Middle Bucks position is that the
court expected sexually abused children to behave like fully ratio-
nal adults, not recognizing that psychological barriers close off
channels of outside communication.
C. The Foster Care Analogy
Both the Middle Bucks and Taylor courts tried to support their
respective views by comparing the student-school relationship to a
foster care relationship. The DeShaney Court decided not to address
the issue whether the state would have an affirmative duty of pro-
tection when a child is placed in foster care. The Court stated that
184. KATHLEEN COULBORN FALLER, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
MANUAL FOR DIAGNOSIS, CASE MANAGEMENT, AND TREATMENT 156 (1988) (discussing
the characteristics and evaluation process of child sexual abuse as well as the techniques
for intervention).
185. Id. at 184.
186. DIANA SULLIVAN EVERSTINE & LOUIS EVERSTINE, SEXUAL TRAUMA IN CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS 74 (1989) (providing guidelines for the assessment and treatment of
child and adolescent sexual abuse).
187. Id.
188. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1380 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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[h]ad the State... removed Joshua from free society and
placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we
might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarcera-
tion or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative
duty to protect. ... Several Courts of Appeals have held
... that the State may be held liable under the Due Pro-
cess Clause for failing to protect children in foster homes
from mistreatment at the hands of their foster parents ...
We express no view on the validity of this analogy, how-
ever, as it is not before us in the present case."9
Several circuit courts, as the DeShaney Court mentioned, have
held that the state has an affirmative duty to protect children in
foster care. The Second Circuit, in Doe v. New York City Depart-
ment of Social Services,'" held that the state has a duty to pro-
tect foster children because "[w]hen individuals are placed in custo-
dy or under the care of the government, their governmental custo-
dians are sometimes charged with affirmative duties, the nonfea-
sance of which may violate the constitution."''9' The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in Taylor by Walker v. Ledbetter,"z also held that a § 1983
claim could be brought against state officials for failing to protect
children in foster care.'93 The court stated that "[t]he liberty inter-
est in this case is analogous to the liberty interest in Youngberg. In
both cases, the state involuntarily placed the person in a custodial
environment... .""' Thus, this behavior is sufficient to establish
an affirmative duty of protection. 5
The Taylor by Walker court subscribed to the position that the
state has an affirmative duty of protection toward children placed
in foster care because "[a] special relationship between the state
and a child arises.""96 The special relationship, and thus an affir-
mative duty, is formed because the state has used its power to re-
189. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
190. 649 F.2d 134 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.190. Catholic Home Bureau v.
Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
191. Id. at 141.
192. 818 F.2d 791 (1lth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489. U.S. 1065 (1989).
193. Id. at 797.
194. Id. at 795. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (holding that a
minor in a state mental health facility has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
"minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue re-
straint!).
195. Taylor by Walker, 818 F.2d at 795.
196. Taylor, 975 F.2d at 146.
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move the child's normal source of protection. The court recognized
that "[a] child generally depends on his parents to guard against
the dangers of his surroundings. ... By removing the child from
his home, even when the child's best interests lie in such action,
the state thereby obligates itself to shoulder the burden of protect-
ing the child from foreseeable trauma."'" The Taylor by Walker
court then applied this logic to the school situation. Since the
school removed the child from its home for a portion of the day, it
therefore the assumed a duty to protect the child while the child
was at school." 8 According to the Taylor by Walker court, the
student-school situation is analogous to foster care, and therefore,
the state has a duty to protect the students.
The Middle Bucks court also recognized that the state could
have an affirmative duty to protect children in foster care, but the
court distinguished the student-school relationship from the foster
care context.19 The court stated that "the child's placement [in
foster care] renders him or her dependent upon the state, through
the foster family, to meet the child's basic needs. Students, on the
other hand, do not depend upon the schools to provide for their
basic human needs."2' In addition, children are in foster care
around the clock, whereas "[p]ublic school students are required to
spend only 180 six-hour days in the classroom per year."' Fur-
thermore, when a child is placed in foster care, the state, as well
as the foster parents who are agents of the state, become the
child's primary caretakers. In contrast, "during the school day...
parents or others remain a child's primary caretakers and
decisionmakers."2 2 Therefore, according to the Middle Bucks
court, a child in foster care is more analogous to a prisoner or a
mental patient than a student. Even if the state has an affirmative
duty of protection to children in foster care, this duty cannot be
extended to students whose situation does not mimic foster
care.
203
It is clear from the foster care analogy that the Middle Bucks
court interpretated DeShaney too narrowly. Despite the arguments
197. Id.
198. Id.




203. Id. at 1372.
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of the Middle Bucks court, foster care is radically different from
incarceration or institutionalization. Physical restraint, one of the
key elements of incarceration and institutionalization, is missing in
the foster care context. Children are not kept under lock and key
in foster homes. Yet, the Middle Bucks court rejects the notion that
schools have custody of the students because the students are not
physically restrained.? To be consistent, the Middle Bucks court
would have to deny that foster care can give rise to an affirmative
duty of protection. However, since the state does have an affmna-
tive duty of protection in the foster care situation, the Middle
Bucks court's interpretation of DeShaney, which would exclude
foster care from situations where the state has a duty to protect the
individual, is incorrect.
D. Factual Differences Between Taylor and Middle Bucks
One could argue that the different outcomes in Middle Bucks
and Taylor are just a function of their substantially different facts.
The crucial factual difference between the two cases is that in
Taylor, the offender was a school employee, whereas in Middle
Buck the perpetrators were students. Courts may be more willing
to place an affirmative duty on the state when the perpetrator is a
state employee as opposed to a private citizen." The Taylor
court stated that "[t]he precise contours of a school official's duty,
as it pertains to injuries inflicted by someone other than a school
teacher (or other subordinate), is not before us." This implies
that the court saw the two situations as distinct, and it may have
reached a different result if the abuse had been inflicted by a stu-
dent. Thus, the difference between the two cases may just be a
factual one. However, it seems unlikely that the question of wheth-
er schools have custody of their students depends upon who vic-
timizes the students. Instead, the custody analysis is independent of
the harm committed, and students are either in the custody of the
school or they are not. Custody is not flexible as to the circum-
stances surrounding a student's injury.
In addition, courts in other contexts have held that both schools
204. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (referring to the Middle Bucks conten-
tion that custody requires 24-hour-a-day physical restraint).
205. Huefier, supra note 68, at 1964 (noting that it is more likely that courts will find
liability when the perpetrator is a state actor).
206. Taylor, 975 F.2d at 147 n.14.
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and school officials have an affirmative duty to protect students
from other students. The Fifth Circuit explained that when the state
mandates school attendance, "it assumes a duty to protect them
[the students] from dangers posed by anti-social activities-their own
and those of other students."2 7 In Lopez v Houston Independent
School District,"°5 school officials were found to have a duty to
protect students from other students. In Lopez, a student was at-
tacked by three fellow students on the school bus. John Lopez, the
plaintiff, was injured because he was seated next to the student
who was attacked.2' The bus driver took no action to stop the
fight."' The Lopez court held that the bus driver could be subject
to constitutional tort liability for not protecting the student if it
were found that he was deliberately indifferent to the student's
plight.2 ' Therefore, courts have held that school officials have a
duty to protect students from each other. Since the question of
custody does not depend upon who perpetrates the crime, the factu-
al differences between Taylor and Middle Bucks cannot be the
basis for their conflicting holdings.
E. The Fear of Massive Liability is Unjustifled
Those opposed to finding a constitutional deprivation in cases
of sexual abuse in the public schools argue that, if the schools
have an affirmative duty of protection, then the schools would be
open to massive liability. One opponent has urged that "'[]local
government officials regard constitutional tort actions as a serious
threat to the fiscal health of cities and counties."'212 School sys-
tems may also fear that if they are found to have custody of the
students, giving them an affirmative duty to protect the students,
the school will be driven into bankruptcy by litigation.2 3 Howev-
er, the assumption that allowing § 1983 claims will lead to an in-
207. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983) (emphasis added) (holding that dog sniffing of cars and
lockers does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but that dog sniffing of children
without reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional).
208. 817 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1987) (allowing a § 1983 claim to proceed against a bus
driver, but prohibiting suit against two superviosry officials).
209. Id. at 352.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 355-56.
212. Huefner, supra note 68, at 1961 (quoting Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab,
The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 650 (1987)).
213. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 650 (1987).
1268 (Vol. 45:1237
SHADES OF DESHANEY
creased number of lawsuits and massive liability has not material-
ized in other areas where § 1983 claims can be made. In fact,
"recent studies of constitutional tort litigation in the federal courts
suggest that, contrary to popular perception, the advantages of §
1983 suits have not led to an unusual increase either in filings of
such suits or in judgments costly to government bodies."214
Therefore, fears that the school will be exposed to intolerable lia-
bility and litigation expenses is not a valid justification for refusing
to extend constitutional protection to victims of sexual abuse in the
public schools.
Opponents also fear that if the courts recognize an affinmative
duty of protection, then schools will be liable for every minor inci-
dent or injury that occurs at school.215 Specifically, opponents
reason that if sexually abused students are allowed to bring consti-
tutional claims against the school, the next time one third-grader
gives another third-grader a bloody nose at recess, the school will
be liable for not protecting the child's liberty rights. However, this
fear is unjustified. For officials to be liable under § 1983, they
must be deliberately indifferent to the plight of a student.216 Mere
negligence upon the part of an official will not trigger liability.2"7
If schools are found to have an affirmative duty of protection,
school officials would be liable only in cases like Taylor and Mid-
dle Bucks, where the officials know that the abuse is occurring but
do nothing to stop it. In cases where school officials do not have
any knowledge of the ongoing abuse, they could not be deliberate-
ly indifferent, and the school system would not liable.
Jones v. Board of Education of School District 50, Archuleta
and Hinsdale Counties"' is an example of a case where the high
standard of culpability insulated the school district from liability. In
Jones, the parents of a child allegedly molested by a fourth grade
teacher brought a § 1983 claim against the school district.1 9
Summary judgment for the school district was affirmed on appeal,
even though the school district conceded that it had an affirmative
duty to protect the child. The school district was not liable be-
214. Huefner, supra note 68, at 1961-62.
215. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 213, at 645.
216. City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 400 U.S. 259, 269 (1987).
217. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (explaining the deliberate
indifference standard for § 1983 liability by inaction).
218. 854 P.2d 1386 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
219. Id. at 1387.
220. Id. at 1390.
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cause it had not been deliberately indifferent to the student's plight.
The court stated that
there was no breach of that affirmative duty because, as
previously stated, the principal, school superintendent,
teachers, and members of the school board neither knew or
reasonably should have known of the offending teacher's
actions until after he was suspended. We [the court] agree
that, without such knowledge, the school board could not
have acted with reckless or deliberate indifference to its
duty to protect plaintiff.2
2
'
As with the Jones case, the high standard of culpability will pre-
vent most cases from becoming § 1983 claims.'
F. Federalism Concerns and State Tort Immunity
Those opposed to imposing an affirmative duty of protection
upon the schools also defend their position by arguing that a
healthy concern for federalism mandates that schools not be held
liable under § 1983.' The Supreme Court applied this line of
reasoning to DeShaney. The Court declined to impose such a sys-
tem of official liability on Wisconsin through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and suggested instead that
voters could impose liability through the tort system. 24 The Mid-
dle Bucks court also stated that a broader interpretation of § 1983
liability "would readily convert much tortious conduct into constitu-
tional violations at the expense of a decent regard for federal-
ism." '  Therefore, the argument suggests that in the interests of
state autonomy and federalism, the courts should allow the states to
221. Id.
222. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Compensation for the Sexually Abused Student, 84 EDUC. L.
REP. 13, 20 (1993) (explaining that "supervisory officials will not be liable under Section
1983 where they had no prior actual or constructive knowledge that a teacher posed a
threat of sexual abuse to the particular student who had been molested."). See also supra
notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
223. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 213, at 645 (stating that under the dominant
articulated perception of constitutional tort litigation, § 1983 cases flood the federal courts
with questionable claims that belong, if anywhere, in state court).
224. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203 ('The people of Wisconsin may well prefer a system
of liability which would place upon the state and its officials the responsibility for failure
to act in situations such as the present one. They may create such a system, if they do
not have it already, by changing the tort law of the state in accordance with the regular
law making process. But they should not have it thrust upon them by this Court's ex-
pansion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.').
225. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377.
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decide whether school officials should be liable for turning their
backs on sexual abuse occurring in the public schools.
However, any action against school systems and school officials
under state tort law would have to be on a theory of negligent
hiring and retention, since respondeat superior liability is inapplica-
ble to these cases.' The doctrine of respondeat superior holds an
employer liable for the tortious conduct of his or her employees if
the tort is committed in the scope of employment. 7 If an action
is authorized by the employer and it is in furtherance of the
employer's business, the action is within the scope of employ-
ment.2 Respondeat superior also requires the tort to be "foresee-
able," defined as "an employee's conduct [that] is not so unusual
or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting
from it among the other costs of the employer's business."'
Sexual abuse is outside the scope of employment, and it is consid-
ered to be an unforeseeable tort. Therefore, "[s]exually molested
plaintiffs are generally not successful in respondeat superior be-
cause courts refuse to find that the personal, self-serving acts of a
sexual abuser are within the scope of authority of the school dis-
trict or are foreseeable risks that the school district should have to
assume."
230
Victims who choose to seek relief under state tort law must
proceed under a negligent hiring and retention theory. Negligent
hiring and retention allows a plaintiff to recover from an employer
for an employee's acts that were committed outside the employee's
scope of employment' if the employee is not suited to the task,
or is dangerous to the public because he or she places third parties
in an unreasonable risk situation. 2 In the school context, a
226. Richard Fossey, Child Abuse Investigations in the Public Schools: A Practical
Guide for School Administrators, 69 EDUC. L. RE'. 991, 996 (1991) (discussing the prob-
lems that arise when a public school administrator investigates an allegation of child
abuse against a school employee).
227. Id. at 995.
228. Bruce Beezer, School District Liability for Negligent Hiring and Retention of Unfit
Employees, 56 EDuc. L. REP. 1117, 1118 (1990) (discussing the concept of negligent hir-
ing and retention in comparison to respondeat superior).
229. Mawdsley, supra note 222, at 25 (quoting Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist.,
176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291 (Ct. App. 1981)).
230. Id.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) (stating that an employer can be
liable if he or she: (1) knows or should have known of an ability to control the employ-
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school and its administrators would be liable if its officers knew or
should have known that a school employee or applicant had a
history of sexual abuse and the school retained or hired the person
despite the person's record. 3 The school would also be liable in
situations where the officers knew of or should have known that an
employee sexually abused a student and the school retained the
employee notwithstanding this knowledge. 4
However, many states have governmental immunities that block
negligent hiring and retention claims against public schools."5
Governmental immunity is a doctrine that absolves goverment
agencies and officials from tort liability when they are acting in
their official capacities. In theory, agencies and officials cannot be
sued for carrying out their governmental functions. 6 The ratio-
nale for this immunitity is that it promotes "vigorous
decisionmaking." 7 This is based on the notion that if officials
are subject to lawsuits, they will not be able to make necessary
decisions because they will fear being sued. School districts have
governmental immunity. 8  Since "hiring and supervision of
school personnel is a discretionary governmental function that is
necessary to carry out public education," 9 the school districts
and officials are immune from liability for their official actions.2'
There are a few courts that have not allowed governmental
immunity to bar negligent hiring and retention claims against
school systems and officials. In Doe v. Durtschi,4 1 the Supreme
233. Mawdsley, supra note 222, at 26-27.
234. Id. at 27.
235. Id. at 26. See Beezer, supra note 228, at 1119 (stating that courts in New Mexico,
Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have upheld governmental immunity for
school officials in negligent hiring and retention actions). See also Scott J. Borth, Com-
ment, Municipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National
Survey, 58 WASH. L. REV. 537, 540-46 nn.23-48 (1983) (demonstrating that in 13 states,
municipal governments and officials have absolute immunity from tort liability, 24 states
retain tort immunity but provide for exceptions in certain circumstances, and 15 states
have abolished governmental tort immunity).
236. E. EDMUND REuTTER, JR. & ROBERT R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION 272 (2d. ed. 1976) (giving a general overview of how the law directly affects public
education in the United States).
237. SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 88.
238. REuorER & HAMILTON, supra note 236, at 272. (explaining that "[sichool districts,
being instrumentalities of the state through which it carries out the state function of edu-
cation, fall within the category of agencies immune from liability for torts")
239. Beezer, supra note 228, at 1119.
240. Mawdsley, supra note 222, at 26.
241. 716 P.2d 1238 (Idaho 1986).
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Court of Idaho found a school district liable for the negligent hir-
ing and retention of a teacher who sexually abused four female
students.242 However, the court based its decision on the fact that
the Idaho state legislature had passed a law that effectively waived
immunity. "[T]he State in enacting the ITCA [Idaho Tort Claims
Act], had 'subjected itself to liability for its own negligent acts and
the negligent acts of its employees .... II43 Thus, the school sys-
tem was liable only because a state law eliminated its immunity. A
few other courts also have refused to allow schools to avoid liabili-
ty for negligent hiring and retention.2' However, "[e]ven in juris-
dictions that permit law suits for negligence against school districts
and employees, courts are often reluctant to find liability for negli-
gent hiring or negligent supervision."'245
Since state tort law generally cannot hold school officials liable
for their deliberate indifference toward sexual abuse, victims must
be allowed to turn to federal law for relief. Holding school systems
liable under § 1983 is necessary because "[c]omplicated state law
immunities may protect municipalities and school districts from
many .state tort claims but will not insulate them from a constitu-
tional tort suit."24 Without § 1983 claims, students who are sexu-
ally abused will remain helpless to hold school officials liable for
ignoring their plight. For example, D.R.'s attorney in Middle Bucks
acknowledged that there was no state remedy available because of
sovereign immunity.247 Misplaced adherence to "federalism" will
obviously not protect the rights of students victimized in the public
schools.
G. Case by Case Approach to Custody
A Villanova law professor, William Valente, has proposed a
compromise position. Instead of a bright line rule that either places
liability on the school or exempts the school from liability, Valente
proposes a presumption that schools do not have special relation-
242. Id. at 1242.
243. Beezer, supra note 228, at 1120 (quoting Durtschi, 716 P.2d at 1243).
244. Id. at 1120.
245. Fossey, supra note 226, at 992-93.
246. Huefner, supra note 68, at 1961.
247. Stephanie B. Goldberg, School Violence: DeShaney Bars Liability, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1992, at 92, 93.
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ships with their students.2" This presumption could only be over-
come if the plaintiff can show "exceptional circumstances" which
place him or her in the full custody of the school.249 In Middle
Bucks, Valente concludes that the school would be liable under his
presumption test because the surrounding circumstances, i.e. the
unruly class room, the confinement to that classroom, and D.R.'s
vulnerability due to her handicap, created an environment where
D.R. was in the custody of the school." However, this approach
fails to address the purpose behind § 1983, which is to deter delib-
erate indifference on the part of school officials when their students
are being abused sexually. Valente's presumption test would not
provide much deterrence because it only protects the small percent-
age of students who can prove themselves to have "exceptional
circumstances."'"
Vin. END RUN DESHANEY?
Applying DeShaney to the school situation would not be a
controversial issue if there were other theories under which these
victims of sexual abuse could hold the school system and the
school officials liable. Two other theories that do not require custo-
dy could allow a student to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
against the school and the school officials. These theories are the
"alternative liability" theory first established in Stoneking v. Brad-
ford Area School District (Stoneking II),2 and the "state-created
danger" theory. It is necessary to analyze these theories because if
they allow students to bring a § 1983 claim, DeShaney can be
circumvented, and therefore, the question of whether the school has
custody of the students would be moot.
A. Alternative Liability
Stoneking II was the first case to apply the theory of alterna-
tive liability to the problem of sexual abuse in the public schools.
Kathleen Stoneking was a student at Bradford Area High School
248. William Valente, Liability for Teacher's Sexual Misconduct with Students-Closing
and Opening Vistas, 74 EDUc. L. REP. 1021, 1027 (1992) (discussing § 1983 and the Su-
preme Court decisions under Title IX).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1028.
251. Id. at 1028-29.




from 1979 until her graduation in 1983.Y She was sexually
abused by Edward Wright, the school's band director. 4 Wright
used force, threats of force, intimidation, and coercion to force
Kathleen to engage in various sexual acts while she was a high
school student from 1980 until 1983, and after her graduation until
1985." 5 Many of these sexual assaults took place in the band
room at the high school or on band-related trips. 6 Wright later
pled guilty to various sex-related crimes." The school's princi-
pal, Frederick Smith, had received complaints about Wright. 8
The most dramatic of these complaints was in 1979."5 A female
student and member of the school band informed Smith that
Wright had attempted to rape her. Smith's response was rather
callous, and after refusing to investigate the student's charges, he
required the student to publicly retract the allegations." Smith
did tell Wright not to have any "one on one" contact with female
students, but Smith made no efforts to enforce this "policy."
262
Smith also kept a personal file of the various complaints and alle-
gations made against Wright, but he kept this file at his home and
actively concealed this information from both the students and their
parents. 3 Richard Miller, the assistant principal, and Frederick
Shuey, the superintendent, were informed of the complaints against
Wright, but neither of them took any action to correct the situa-
tion. Kathleen Stoneking filed a claim against the school dis-
trict, Smith, Miller, and Shuey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
The first time this case reached the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, the defendants were appealing the denial of their summary
judgment motion. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court and
held that both schools and their officials could be liable under §
253. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594,
[hereinafter Stoneldng 1], cert. granted and judgment vacated
Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989).
254. Stoneking 11, 882 F.2d at 722.
255. Stoneking I, 856 F.2d at 595-96.
256. Id. at 596.
257. Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 722.
258. Stoneldng I, 856 F.2d at 595.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Stoneking 11, 882 F.2d at 722.
262. Id. at 729.
263. Id.
264. Stoneking I, 856 F.2d at 595.
265. Stoneking 11, 882 F.2d at 722; Stoneking I, 856 F.2d at 595-
595 (3d. Cir. 1988)
sub nom. Smith v.
-96.
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1983 for failing to protect their students.266 Thus, Stoneking I
asserted that schools have an affirmative duty to protect their stu-
dents.267 The court based this duty on the notion that students are
in the "functional custody" of the school: "because students are
placed in school at the command of the state and are not free to
decline to attend, students are in what may be viewed as functional
custody of the school authorities, at least at the time they are pres-
ent.' " The court's analysis was similar to the analysis done by
the Taylor court when it reasoned that mandatory attendance cre-
ates custody (or functional custody), which forms a special rela-
tionship, thus imposing an affirmative duty of protection on the
state. Therefore, schools and school officials are liable if they
breach that duty.269 However, Stoneking I was decided before
DeShaney. After DeShaney was decided, the Supreme Court re-
manded Stoneking I to the Third Circuit to reconsider the decision
in light of DeShaney.27°
On remand, the Third Circuit once again held that the defen-
dants could be liable under § 1983."' However, while not reject-
ing its analysis in Stoneking I, the court decided to base its deci-
sion in Stoneking 11 on the alternative liability theory because of
fears that "uncertainty of the law" caused by DeShaney could lead
to further delays. 2  The court held that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
the school officials were liable if they "established and maintained
a policy, practice or custom which directly caused her constitution-
al harm." '273 Additionally, the court stated that "[1]iability of...
policymakers for policies or customs chosen or recklessly main-
tained is not dependent upon the existence of a 'special
relationship' between the .. . officials and the individuals
harmed."274 Thus, since no special relationship is required for lia-
bility to attach, alternative liability circumvents DeShaney.
The Stoneking II court cited City of Canton v. Harris'5 to
266. Stoneking 1, 856 F.2d at 602.
267. Id. at 603.
268. Id. at 601.
269. See id. at 600 (citing Youngberg and Estelle to indicate that the state has an affir-
mative duty to protect individuals that are in the state's custody).
270. Smith v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062, 1062 (1989).
271. Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 725.
272. Id. at 724.
273. Id. at 725.
274. Id.
275. 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (involving injuries to a person in police custody).
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support its decision 6 In Harris, the Court held that a municipal-
ity could be liable under § 1983 "where the failure to train [offi-
cers] amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact. ' "m Similarly, the
Stoneking II court held that a jury could conclude that the
defendants' actions, and inactions, could have been viewed as a
communication to Wright that his conduct would not be prohibited,
thus establishing a custom or policy that the teacher's sexual abuse
of students would not be punished27 Thus, schools and school
officials may be held liable under § 1983 if they maintain a policy
or custom which harms individuals. This alternative liability theory
does not require that there be a special relationship between the
state and the victim.
The Taylor court developed two independent lines of reasoning
which both concluded that the school officials could be liable for a
§ 1983 violation. One theory was that the students were in the
"custody" of the school, thus the school had an affirmative duty of
protection,279 and the other was the Stoneking II alternative liabili-
ty theory."0 The Taylor court concluded that "school officials can
find themselves liable for the malfeasance of their subordinates if
they know or should be aware of the transgressions, yet conscious-
ly choose not to put an end to them, for such dereliction can only
be viewed as implicit condonation of the subordinate's constitution-
al indiscretion.""as Therefore, it was unnecessary for the Taylor
276. Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 725.
277. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388.
278. Stoneking I1, 882 F.2d at 728-29 (stating that between 1978 and 1982 Smith and
Miller received at least five complaints about sexual assault of female students by teachers
and staff members; that Shuey was told about some of these complaints; that Smith re-
corded these and other allegations in a secret file at home -rather than in the teachers'
personnel files, which a jury could view as active concealment; that the defendants gave
such teachers excellent performance evaluations, which a jury could view as communi-
cation by the defendants to the teachers that the conduct of which they were accused
would not reflect negatively on them; and that Smith and Miller discouraged and/or intim-
idated students and parents from pursuing complaints, on one occasion by forcing a stu-
dent to publicly recant her allegation). For general discussion of the Stoneking cases, see
Valente, supra note 63, at 645.
279. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that
"by compelling a child to attend public school, the state cultivates a special relationship
with that child and thus owes him an affirmative duty of protection"), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1436 (1993), vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (1993), reheard en banc, 15 F.3d 443 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994).
280. Id. at 144 (holding that school officials may be liable for a policy of "reckless
indifference" toward abuse).
281. Id. at 145.
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court to find the schools liable under DeShaney because the alter-
native liability theory of Stoneking II would have provided a suffi-
cient basis for liability.282
It should be noted, however, that the alternative liability theory
cannot be applied to every case of sexual abuse that occurs in the
public schools because it is only applicable to instances where an
employee of the school has committed the sexual abuse. The
Stoneking II court distinguished the case from DeShaney partly on
the basis that the perpetrator in DeShaney was a private citizen,
whereas in Stoneking II, the perpetrator was a state employee "sub-
ject to [the] defendants' immediate control." 3 The Stoneking II
court also implied that alternative liability applies only when state
employees commit the torts by stating that "[niothing in DeShaney
suggests that state officials may escape liability arising from their
policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by
their subordinates. 284 Similarly, the Taylor court indicated that
alternative liability is limited to instances of malfeasance of subor-
dinates.25 Furthermore, the Middle Bucks court, the same court
that decided Stoneking II, held that alternative liability did not
apply to Middle Bucks because the sexual assaults were committed
by students, not by state employees, stating that "this case lacks
the linchpin of Stoneking II, namely, a violation by state ac-
tors." '6 Because the perpetrators in Middle Bucks were private
actors, the case was not distinguishable from DeShaney.'
Stoneking I is also limited in applicability by the facts of the
case itself. Alternative liability may be restricted to cases where
school officials ignore sexual abuse that occurs over a period of
years. One commentator, in an article advising school administra-
tors about their potential liability in child abuse cases, wrote:
School administrators should not be alarmed by the
Stoneking decision. The student's allegations, that school
282. In fact, this is precisely what the Fifth Circuit did upon rehearing Taylor. The
court avoided the issue of custody and only applied the alternative liability theory. Taylor,
15 F.3d at 452-56.
283. Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 724.
284. Id. at 725.
285. Taylor, 975 F.2d at 144. (stating that the plaintiff must show that subordinates
committed the offensive acts).
286. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1376 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
287. See Barr, supra note 168, at 1063-64 (noting that the Middle Bucks court relied on
an extension of DeShaney).
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officials failed to respond to complaints of sexual assault
over a period of several years, are quite unusual. Since
state law requires school officials to report suspected child
abuse immediately to state authorities, there should be few
instances in which a student could plausibly claim that
school administrators condoned a pattern of sexual assault
over a long period of time."
Therefore, because sexual assault cases in schools are unlikely to
last for several years, alternative liability will not be available in
most cases of sexual abuse.
B. State-Created Danger
The "state-created danger theory" is another way in which state
agencies and officials can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under this theory, the state assumes an affirmative duty to protect
an individual.
If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private
persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard
to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an
active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake
pit."9
Many federal courts have applied this theory in a variety of
contexts. In Wood v. Ostrander,"t an arresting officer stranded an
intoxicated driver's female passenger in a dangerous neighborhood,
and the woman was raped while trying to get home.Y The court
held that the police officer had placed the woman in a position of
danger, and since the officer failed to protect her, the he was po-
tentially liable for a constitutional tort. 2  The Eleventh Circuit
concluded in Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake293 that the state
created a danger by allowing prisoners with records of violence to
participate in a work release program at city hall."4 In Cornelius,
288. Fossey, supra note 226, at 994.
289. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that officials were
not liable under § 1983 for releasing a mental patient who later killed because they did
not place the victim in a position of danger).
290.-879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).
291. Id. at 586.
292. Id. at 589-90 (reversing the district court's summary judgment dismissal for the
police officer).
293. 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990).
294. Id. at 359.
12791995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
two prisoners took a female city clerk hostage and held her for
three days."5 The court concluded that the state had affirmatively
created the danger, and therefore, could be held liable under §
1983 for violating the clerk's Fourteenth Amendment rights."l
Therefore, when a state official's actions place a person in a dan-
gerous situation, the state assumes responsibility for that person's
safety. If the state fails to protect that person, the state may be
liable under § 1983 for violating the person's Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to bodily integrity.
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court recognized that the state
would have had an affirmative duty of protection if it had created
the danger, and that custody would not have been required in such
case to impose liability under § 1983.297 However, DeShaney held
that the state-created danger theory was not applicable because the
state did not place Joshua DeShaney in danger. "While the State
may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free
world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to
render him any more vulnerable to them." ' Since Joshua was
already in danger from his father, the state did not create the dan-
ger.'l Additionally, by leaving Joshua in his father's custody, the
state did not increase Joshua's danger; therefore, the state could not
be liable under the state-created danger theory.3" This language
indicates that if the state had been responsible for Joshua's predica-
ment, the state would have been liable despite the fact that Joshua
was not in the state's custody. Therefore, custody may not be
necessary in cases where the state creates the danger.
It should be noted, however, that the state-created danger theo-
ry is limited to cases where state officials take affirmative actions
that create or exacerbate danger to an individual."' One can de-
termine from the DeShaney holding that failing to diffuse a danger-
ous situation or failing to prevent harm does not constitute a situa-
295. Id. at 350.
296. Id. at 355-59.
297. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197-201
(1989).
298. Id. at 201.
299. Id.
300. Id. (noting that "when [the state] returned [Joshua] to his father's custody, it
placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted
at all.")
301. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
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tion where the state has created the danger. 2 One court has not-
ed that "[plost-DeShaney courts have [interpreted DeShaney] by
asking whether the state actors involved affirmatively acted to
create plaintiff's danger, or render him or her more vulnerable to
it."
303
The limited applicability of the state-created danger theory
becomes shockingly clear when one examines the case of Brown v.
Grabowski.3 In Brown, a woman complained to the police that
her former boyfriend had sexually assaulted and threatened her.0
However, the police took no significant action, and the woman was
later murdered by her ex-boyfriend.31 The court held that the po-
lice were not liable under the state-created danger theory because
they had not created the danger, nor they had done anything to
increase the danger. 7 Similarly, a state-created danger theory
could not be used in cases of sexual abuse in the public schools,
unless the school officials took affirmative actions that made stu-
dents more vulnerable to the abuse.
The Middle Bucks case dealt with the issue of whether the
school officials were liable under a state-created danger theory. The
plaintiffs alleged that the school system and its officials
created a climate which facilitated sexual and physical
abuse of students, by: (1) failing to report to the parents or
other authorities the misconduct resulting in abuse to plain-
tiffs; (2) placing the class under the control of an inade-
quately trained and supervised student teacher; (3) failing to
demand proper conduct of the student defendants; and (4)
failing to investigate and put a stop to the physical and
sexual misconduct.3 8
The physical layout of the classroom, which had a unisex
bathroom, was also cited as a factor which increased the danger of
sexual abuseY.3  The plaintiffs contended that these factors exacer-
bated the danger of sexual abuse, and thus, the school and the
school officials should be liable under the state-created danger
302. Id.
303. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1373.
304. 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991).
305. Id. at 1101-02.
306. Id. at 1102-03.
307. Id. at 1120-21.
308. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1373 (quoting L.H.'s Amended Complaint).
309. Id. at 1375.
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theory.310
However, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument.311 Ac-
cording to one commentator, "[t]he majority focused on the fact
that the school did not take affirmative actions to create the danger
and, therefore, did not have a duty to protect the students.31
The court did not agree that having a unisex bathroom in any way
increased the danger of sexual abuse because "[t]he same conduct
could have occurred had the school built separate bathrooms for its
male and female students., 313 Additionally, the court held that for
the state to be liable under the state-created danger theory, the risk
of the plaintiffs' injury must have been forseeable.3 14 The court
concluded that the school did not create a danger by assigning a
student teacher or failing to stop the chaotic atmosphere of the
classroom because these actions or omissions did not create a fore-
seeable risk of sexual abuse.31" Additionally, the court noted that
the school's failure to report the sexual abuse, a state law require-
ment, was not sufficient for a § 1983 claim.316 The majority con-
cluded that the defendants did not take affirmative steps that creat-
ed or exacerbated the danger to the plaintiffs, stating that "[tihe
most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that
they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dic-
tated a more active role for them. 317
Judge Sloviter's dissenting opinion agreed with the plaintiffs
that the school had exacerbated the danger of sexual abuse, stating
that "the School District cannot claim that it did not play some
role in creating the danger to D.R. or making her 'more vulnera-
ble.""' Sloviter believed that the school system's and school
officials' conduct did rise to the level of affirmative acts because
it was the school that designed the unisex lavatory in the
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Barr, supra note 168, at 1069.
313. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1375.
314. Id. at 1374-75 (citing Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238,
1253 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that a city was not liable under § 1983 for a minor
informant's suicide because the forseeable risk was retaliation against two informants or
his family, not suicide), affd, 991 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1993)).
315. Id. at 1373-74.
316. Id. at 1375 (citing Brown for the proposition that "section 1983 liability arises only
from a violation of federal statutory or constitutional rights under the color of state law").
317. Id. at 1376 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203).
318. Id. at 1382 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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classroom; it was the school that refused to allow D.R. to
use another lavatory; it was the school that hired an inex-
perienced student teacher;, and it was the school that toler-
ated the chaotic behavior and the sexual aggressiveness of
the students.319
Sloviter concluded that since these acts contributed to the danger
posed by the student defendants, the school should have been liable
for increasing the danger of sexual abuse.
Judge Becker wrote a separate dissent in Middle Bucks. Becker
did not agree with Sloviter's conclusion that the students were in
the custody of the school."2 However, Becker did believe that, in
this case, the school should be liable under the state-created danger
theory. 2' Becker acknowledged that the state created the danger
of sexual assault by compelling D.R. to attend school and confin-
ing her "to a dangerous unisex bathroom and chaotic class-
room."3' Becker concluded that "the school took affirmative
steps to confine the student to situations where she was physically
threatened."3" Therefore, the school should have been liable un-
der the state-created danger theory.
The state-created danger theory appears to be a tenuous theory
on which to base school liability. Whether this theory is applicable
to any particular case depends on how the court interprets the
school's actions. If the school's actions rise to the level of affrmna-
tive acts which create or increase the level of danger, then the
school will be liable. However, under DeShaney, a school's failure
to take action when aware of dangers is not an affirmative ac-
tion.324 Courts may be inclined to label school defendants' actions
as passive because of "the Supreme Court's strong reluctance to
use the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of affirmative du-
ties."3' Even Justice Becker in his Middle Bucks dissent felt that
the case was unique, implying that in most cases of sexual abuse
in the schools the state would not have created the danger."2
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1384.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1384 (Becker, J., dissenting).
323. Id.
324. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
325. Huefner, supra note 68, at n.138 (relying on DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 which
stated that "the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests").
326. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1384 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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Despite the facts of Middle Bucks, the majority would not hold the
school liable under the state-created danger theory. Therefore, it
seems likely that in other cases where the students are sexually
abused by other students at school, the state-created danger theory
will not apply.
IX. CONCLUSION
Schools should be found to have a special relationship with
their students because this effectuates the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Specifically, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is a limitation on the state's power, and the purpose
of the clause is "to secure the individual from the arbitrary exer-
cise of the powers of government' . . .and 'to prevent governmen-
tal power from being used for purposes of oppression."'327 Nor-
mally this is a negative right, but, as this Note has demonstrated,
in some cases the state may have an affirmative obligation. The
purpose of allowing a civil claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the state and its officials is to enforce the Due Process Clause, and
to hold public officials accountable when those officials violate
constitutional rights. Holding officials liable not only provides the
victim with compensation, but it has the additional effect of deter-
ring the unconstitutional behavior by creating an incentive for those
officials not to violate an individual's rights.32 Therefore, if we
want to prevent school officials from behaving the way they did in
Taylor and Middle Bucks, courts should hold them accountable.
Allowing school officials to escape liability when they turn their
backs on sexual abuse signals to all school officials that willfull
ignorance will be tolerated.
DeShaney was an attempt by the Supreme Court to clarify
when state agencies would have affirmative duties toward individu-
als. However, by predicating special relationships on custody, the
Court put forth a vague standard. Now, custody does not have a
clear definition, and this has led to the controversy as to whether
the schools can be liable for the sexual abuse of their students.
Taylor and Middle Bucks are the most recent examples of this
controversy. Taylor interpreted custody broadly and held that the
school was liable, whereas Middle Bucks subscribed to a narrow
327. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986)).
328. Huefner, supra note 68, at 1962.
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definition of custody, and therefore found that the school did not
have an affirmative duty to protect its students. However, the alter-
native liability theory, promulgated in Stoneking II, removes from
the custody controversy cases where a school employee is the
perpetrator of the sexual abuse. In these cases the school system
and its officials are liable under § 1983 without finding a special
relationship between the school and the student. Special relation-
ships, and therefore, custody, are still necessary to establish liability
in cases where the sexual abuse is committed by a student. Howev-
er, the student's situation at school is significantly analogous to
other situations where the courts have recognized that the state has
an affirmative duty of protection regardless of who commits the
abuse. Therefore, students should be afforded the constitutional
protection that § 1983 provides.
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